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Intentionality and design
C. Burnette The University of the Arts, Philadelphia, USA

Abstract
This paper suggests that: a model of Intentionality is required in any theory of design thinking; that
”intending” is systematically informed and constrained by experience; that it is cognitively
structured in terms of the source-path-goal schema; and that this schema frames, threads and
manages other modes of thinking during design. The philosophical roots, cognitive structure and
operational requirements of intentional thinking are indicated and a computational model of design
thinking which would enable Intentionality in design to become more accessible as a subject of
research is referenced.
“What use would thinking be at all, unless we could relate each thing’s details to our plans and
intentions” (Minsky 1985:88)

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

1

Intentionality and design
Introduction
Designing is a purposeful act, yet philosophical issues of “Intentionality” (Searle 1983),
“Intentional stance” (Dennett 1996), “intentional programming” (Simonyi 1996) and memetic
entailments from prior experience (Dawkins 1976) regarding the designer’s intentions and activities
have not received adequate consideration by design researchers. This is despite design research
topics such as situated thinking (Gero 1998) and the application of strategic knowledge (Gero and
Hori 2001), that depend on the designer’s intention for their apprehension, interpretation and
implementation. Similarly, implications from cognitive science regarding purposeful thought have
not been viewed through the lens of design thinking. Is intending a distinct mode of thought? If so
what are its operational characteristics? What differentiates it from other modes of thought during
design? How might it be apprehended in operational, computational terms?
Every designer brings to the task of design their background understandings and a desire to address
the contingencies of the design task. Their intentions largely depend on how they understand what
the task is “about”, and what they think or do under the conditions they encounter. What designers
learn through education and experience influences what they do and helps to build the meanings
their thoughts and actions have for them. Although the personal history that informs a designer’s
“vision” is usually considered when they are chosen for a project, this background is usually not
correlated to the activities of designing. Understandings between designer, client and others –
interpretations influenced by their own intentions and backgrounds – are often poorly grounded and
illusory during design. Important issues (such as creative expression) not implicit in the design
problem or process but dictated by the personal and cultural histories through which the design task
is interpreted remain largely inaccessible to research.
Although Schön (1987) has provided an influential treatise on reflective thinking during design,
techniques of protocol analysis yielding cognitive models of prior experiences have been developed
(Zachary and Ryder 1996) and research on the application of design strategies by individual
designers (Cross 2001: Kruger and Cross 2001) has been undertaken, there appears to be little
theory-based research concerning how purposes and goals become established and operate in the
minds of designers. The shifts in intent and focus which redirect specific thoughts and actions to
achieve a persistent but changing objective are not well understood. Assumptions in the designer’s
approach to a design task are rarely made explicit and no computational model of intention and its
interaction with other modes of design thinking has been fully implemented. (Burnette 1982, 1984,
1999, 2001c) Instead, the problem statement, design brief, strategy or procedural rationale is
accepted as explication enough.
The intent in writing this paper is to illuminate the concept of Intentionality and to suggest how the
representation of human intentions can be made more explicit and useful during design. The
treatment proposed is part of what is, apparently, the first model of designing which attempts to
represent intentional thought in operational terms suitable for implementation in a computational
design support system.

Intentionality and meaning
Intentionality has been defined (Johnson 1987:177) as the capacity of a mental state or some kind of
representation (concept, image, word, sentence) to be about, or directed at, some dimension or
aspect of one’s experience. John Searle (1983) understood Intentionality to depend on a “network”
of meanings – a “background”– that was not intentional. Johnson has argued (against Searle) that
Intentionality cannot be divorced from the conditions that give it context and meaning; that this
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“background” is always part of meaning and therefore of Intentionality; and that the meaning of an
experience to an individual must be both intentionally established and mediated by human
understanding because “otherwise there would be no relation between symbolic representations and
experience. …Something becomes meaningful by pointing beyond itself to event structures
representing prior experience or toward possible future structures.” (Johnson 1987:177-178)
The view presented here accepts Johnson’s argument while recognizing that Intentionality and the
background knowledge that informs it are different, unique to the mind of the individual and
distinct from situated experiences (such as design projects) which they respectively address and
assimilate. Intentionality involves the interaction between various aspects of mental or physical
experience and that part of the web of “meanings” in the individual’s mind that constitute their
understandings regarding that experience. Intentional phenomena are basically semantic in that
they address how processes in a brain become symbolic of something beyond themselves. (Miller
1985:10)
Although intentions are informed by and help generate “meanings” they also motivate actions to
change a situation to have a desired meaning or to suit an understanding. Such imaginative
projections and transformative actions necessarily rely on the understandings that constitute the
individual’s “background” knowledge. Like a design project, an intention is directed, pursued and
managed until the experience with which it is concerned becomes represented in the “meanings”
that constitute the individual’s understanding of the experience. The new understandings that
emerge in the mind as an intention is pursued are further indexed, organized and generalized in
dynamic memory (Schank 1999) to constitute knowledge accessible to future intentions.
In this context, the basic questions to be addressed regarding Intentionality are: how do intentional
interactions arise and how are prior understandings adjusted to circumstances (and vice-versa). The
ontological and operational problems for design thinking lie in how the designer’s understanding
and skill are mapped to the contingencies of the design task. These contingencies have been
categorized at a high level of abstraction (Burnette 1982, 1994, 2001a) as informational, conceptual,
representational, operational, and evaluative –the designer needs relevant information, ideas,
representations, actions, and criteria to direct and realize his or her intentions. All such “contingent
domains” constitute “aspects of a situated experience” that specify and qualify what the designer
thinks about and does in the subject context. Each involves a different mode of thought requiring
different cognitive skills. For example, the use of information requires lexical and linguistic skills,
having ideas requires associative and analytic skills, generating and interpreting representations
requires formulative and mediative skills, executing actions require procedural and operational
skills, and experiential assessment requires monitoring and evaluative skills. Although these five
modes of thought have different goals and address different aspects of an individual’s actual (or
imagined) experience to shape his or her understanding of it, they are neither intentions nor the
background knowledge that informs intention, both of which are unique to the designer’s mind, not
to the circumstances of the design task.
In this theory the five objective modes of thought provide the substantive content for the Intending
and Integrating modes of thinking that respectively manage the current experience and reference
prior experience. Operating at a higher level of cognition, the Intending and Integrating modes are
free to focus, adapt, apply and build meaning and understanding in the mind of the individual
considering information from either current or prior experience. The distinction between the five
domains of thought contingent on the design task and the two domains manifesting Intention and
Knowledge is of both philosophical and practical consequence. Intentionality depends on
background knowledge but is distinguished from it by its capacity to specify what newly generated
meaning is about. It also helps to generate new understandings by relating current experience to
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prior knowledge. The five modal domains provide the objective context and aspectual structure
needed to map intentions and background knowledge to each other and to experiences in the world.

Fig 1: Metacognitive and situated modes of thought in an intentional frame
As Figure 1 suggests, Intending and Integrating are understood to interact with experiential
information through mediating devices such as symbolic representations, perceptual gestalts, and
image schema which focus, frame and structure attention.

The Intentional Frame
Intending is the mode of thought assumed to be responsible for establishing a “mental space”
(Fauconnier 1997) or “frame of mind” (Minsky 1985) capable of containing and developing a
thought (expression, task, project, etc) through to its conclusion. Such framing is how the mind
deals with complexity and the richness of the world and is essential to the apprehension of meaning,
the direction of thought and action, and the application of language, communication, and skill. The
importance of framing to thought cannot be overstated: “Our minds are always automatically
applying a rich variety of frames to guide us through the world…A frame provides a “world view”:
It carves the world into defined categories of entities and properties, defines how these categories
are related to each other, suggests operations that might be performed, defines what goal is to be
achieved, provides methods for interpreting observations in terms of the problem space and other
knowledge, provides criteria to discriminate success from failure, suggests what information is
lacking and how to get it, and so on….Because the world cannot supply to the system what the
system needs first in order to learn about the world, the essential kernels of content specific framing
must be supplied initially by the architecture.” (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992:107) I have
suggested elsewhere an architecture of frames (Burnette 2001b) based on cognitive schema
(Burnette 2001a) implementing “modes of design thinking” (Burnette 1982) that reflects these
considerations.
Because framing is essential to the apprehension of thought and meaning, a fundamental role of
Intending is to create, focus and configure the intentional frame. Some capability is also required
within the frame to support the process of resolving meaning or outcome and to resolve and/or
terminate a frame. The philosophical, and cognitive rationale outlining a structure for Intentionality
that supports these capabilities follows.
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Fig 2: Processing agencies and levels within an intentional frame

The Structure of Intentions
If Intentionality is understood to be “about” something and about doing something in an
experiential context based on understandings gained from prior experience, then how are intentions
generated and how can they be apprehended, represented and managed to fulfillment? Dennett
(1996) has argued that designing can be understood as the act of applying an intention to quickly
arrive at an acceptable solution from many possible ones. He has defined “Intentional stance” as
“the strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating
it as if it were a rational agent who governed its “choice” of ”action” by a “consideration” of its
“beliefs” and “desires”. (Dennett 1996:27) The implication is that intentions are grounded in
beliefs and desires which are mental constructs based on prior experiences. We “read” the
“Intentional stance” of other people and understand their behavior using inferences from such
constructs. Within this context, he has defined “Design stance” as behavior in which one predicts
that an entity is designed as they suppose it to be and will operate according to that design.
Similarly, Dennett defines “Physical stance” as behavior in which one predicts based on the laws of
physics and the physical constitution of things. Thus, an “Intentional stance” is one in which the
thinker makes assumptions based on past experience in the world. A “Design stance” is one in
which the thinker predicts events based on perceived patterns or cues relating form to behaviors
known to be associated with such forms, while a “Physical stance” is one in which the thinker
predicts outcomes based on the experienced properties of things. Although for Dennett all three
stances are directed at entities to help explain them, one might characterize the designer’s frame of
mind (desires, meanings, assumptions, perceptions, capacities, goals, and relevant knowledge)
regarding the design task as their “Intentional stance”, their mind set regarding what to do and
expect as their “Design stance” and their appreciation of properties of the problem as their
“Physical stance”. The “Intentional stance” is thus declarative and directive, the “Design stance”
prescriptive and procedural, and the “Physical stance” experiential and descriptive regarding states
of mind and the world they represent. Although thought may proceed from “Intentional stance”
(desire) to “Design stance” (proposal) to “Physical stance” (execution and testing), it may fail to
progress from one stance to another. (As, for example, when a desire or belief is overridden by a
predicted outcome, or expectation failure.) All three stances within an intentional frame may
remain purposefully focused and persistent over many disjunctive events until the conditions of
satisfaction for the intention are met, changed or dismissed.
Minsky (1985) has noted that it is useful to distinguish interactive levels of thinking in order to
reduce complexity. It is suggested that intentional thought has three levels: the highest level
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associated with “Intentional stance” and concerned with establishing the scope and direction of a
thought; the intermediate level, associated with “Design stance” and concerned with managing
pursuit of the intention through pattern finding and knowledge based propositions and the lowest
level associated with “Physical stance” and concerned with empirical assessment of status and
confirmation of fulfillment. This hierarchy implies that an interim direction or goal must be
declared before a “Design stance” is taken and a “Design stance” must be taken before a goal can
be satisfied. This serial processing implication is overcome by assuming default values
(expectations) for each stance based on a prior experience. In this way an initial approach and goal
is always available even if it does not fit the situation being addressed (i.e prejudice, bias, false
assumptions, etc.) and processing can be initiated from any stance.
This model recalls Kant’s three part categorization of mental faculties, as “willing”, “feeling” and
“knowing” (conative, affective and cognitive). However, here the model is conceived as a three
level structure of intentional cognition in which affective faculties are distributed across all stances
and levels: “willing” (feeling about) is associated with bringing an intention into being, “feeling”
(feeling engaged) with the process of pursuing the intention, and “knowing” (feeling informed) with
its experienced fulfillment. This is consistent with the understanding that “Emotions are, in essence,
impulses to act.” (Goleman 1996:6 ) and thus inherent to Intentionality in all its aspects. In this
regard, Pinker (1997:373) has noted that “Once triggered by a propitious moment, an emotion
triggers the cascade of goals and sub goals that we call thinking and acting. Because the goals and
means are woven into a multiply nested control structure of sub goals within sub goals within sub
goals, no sharp line divides thinking from feeling...."

Cognitive structure
The cognitive structure of Intentionality is best represented by the source-path-goal image schema
(Lakoff 1987, Johnson 1987). (Image schema are generalized cognitive structures that organize
information obtained from the body, through the senses or from other mental constructs. They
operate at a level of generality and abstraction above mental images and constitute cognitive
structures for organizing experience and comprehension.) The source-path-goal image schema is
basic to understanding all processes that go from an initial state to a desired state as well as for the
metaphorical translation of meaning from an understood source to a less understood target. In this
proposal, the “Intentional stance” is identified as the “source” agency, addressing stimuli,
background, and direction; the “Design stance” as the “path” agency addressing issues of process,
persistence and prediction while the “Physical stance” functions as the “goal” agency registering
outcome, difference and value. Although collaborating in the agency of Intentionality, each sub
agency has certain responsibilities.

The “Source” agent
How might an intentional source agent in a hierarchically structured source-path-goal schema
operate? Intentionality is a natural consequence of being in the world. The brain automatically
compares new information flowing into it to what it knows and makes predictions about what to
expect based on that knowledge. Errors and conflicts are detected during this process and cause the
brain to search for resolution. Background knowledge and incoming information regarding a
situation never match exactly. However, if the match is sufficient, resolution is automatic, the
expected actions and outcomes occur and there is no expectation failure and no problem to solve. If
a mismatch can’t be automatically interpreted or transformed using the referenced information the
process of intentional (often conscious) goal attainment is initiated. This switch in mental focus
establishes the intentional frame in which the problem between incoming and background
information is ultimately resolved (displaced either by passing it to episodic memory when
resolution is achieved or by subordinating, deferring or dismissing resolution (through
reprioritization, etc). Thus, the source agent must be able to index knowledge from prior experience
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in dynamic response to new information coming into an intentional frame from the world of
concern. To do this efficiently the source agent must generate an intentional frame that shares a
common aspectual structure with incoming information and memory (Burnette 2001a, 2001b).
A metaphor occurs when the designer attempts to understand a focal situation in terms of what they
already understand. The mapping of the “source” situation to whatever “target” information is
recognized as relevant (semantically, structurally, figurally, operationally, or evaluatively) gives
structured content to the intentional frame. For example, a semantic apprehension of the focal
situation as “fragmented”, directs one to consider the structure of fragmentation, suggests many
prototypes of fragmented things, processes for how things fragment and come together and asserts a
value of wholeness against which fragmentation can be judged. Thus, the metaphor both “frames”
the intention and “generates” the instruments for interactive transformation of the information it
references. In this regard, Schön’s (1979) concept of “generative metaphor” has all the elements
required of the source agent in an intentional frame: it semantically expresses the problem of an
unfamiliar situation, sets the direction in which to seek resolution, establishing structures and
strategies for selective attention, references normative models or prototypes as mediating
representations, invokes actionable questions and processes and establishes appreciative values.
Thus the “source” of an intention (what it is about) lies in the interaction between prior knowledge
and incoming information. Directedness (what to do, what “path” to follow, what approach to take,
what “Design stance” to assume) and what outcome to anticipate (what comparisons to make, what
criteria to employ, what goals to attain) are determined through metaphorical projection within an
intentional frame. At minimum this implies indexing, threading and prioritizing functions in the
source agency, subjects extensively studied in the field of artificial intelligence and case based
reasoning (Schank 1999, Kolodner 1987).

The “Path” agent
Basic to understanding how information in an intentional frame is resolved at the “Path” level of
cognitive processing is the notion that designing is purposeful, persistent and directed – a goal
driven activity with conditions of satisfaction. Designers know from experience that a design is not
usually immediately apparent, especially if the contingencies involved in the project are complex,
ill determined, and emergent, or if the designer is inexperienced or lacking relevant information or
expertise. The process of solving a problem or creating a design is highly interactive and dynamic,
constantly referencing and adapting the thinker’s knowledge in a process Schön (1987) has called
“reflection in action.” It is suggested that this persistent, goal directed interactivity is conducted
through the “path” agent operating in the “Design stance”. Processing at this level of agency is
invoked when the “source” agent establishes a project or task by framing a metaphor between some
understood source and the focal information.
As Minsky (1985:78-79) noted “A “goal-driven” system does not seem to react directly to the
stimuli or situation it encounters. Instead it treats the things it finds as objects to exploit, avoid, or
ignore, as though it were concerned with something else that doesn’t yet exist. When any
disturbance or obstacle diverts a goal-directed system from its course, that system seems to try to
remove the interference, go around it, or turn it to some advantage…What kind of process inside a
machine could give the impression of having a goal – of purpose, persistence and
directedness….The difference engine scheme remains the most useful conception of goal, purpose,
or intention yet discovered. … The idea of a difference-engine embodies a representation of some
outcome and a mechanism to make it persist until the outcome is achieved…. (it) must contain a
description of a desired situation. It must have subagents that are aroused by various differences
between the desired situation and the actual situation. Each subagent must act in a way that tends to
diminish the difference that aroused it.” It is this last requirement that necessitates ways to shift
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attention to different aspects of an experience, different understandings or memories until reframing
or reinterpretation of the intention results in an acceptable resolution. This is the strength of the
“Design stance” in which something which behaves in the manner required is proposed through
conjecture, hypothesis, or similar means. While a mismatch, choice, or goal is instrumental in
launching an intentional frame and proposition and prediction in processing it, measurement and
prioritization are necessarily involved in managing the goal attainment process. These depend on
the assessment of predictions and outcomes.

The “Goal” agent
Although the pursuit of an intention is goal directed, and a goal is always available in an intentional
frame by default or as a result of metaphorical projection and development, a supporting agency is
required to monitor status relative to the goal, and confirm that the goal has been attained, changed
or dismissed. A comparative assessment is involved in which there is a reference entity or criteria
(the goal) and an expectation or predicted outcome resulting from the resolution process. The
resolution must also involve assimilation into the network of meaning that represents the design
objective for the individual, supports their memories regarding it, and facilitates the abstraction,
generalization and indexing of knowledge for future use as preferences, expectations, rules of
thumb, etc. Intentionality, it will be recalled, always interprets and assimilates outcomes in terms of
the background experience of the individual thinker.
Although not fully defined, these component agents, structures, forms, processes and criteria are
posited as the roots of Intentionality - aboutness, directed action and assessment. Together they
permit focusing on what to attend, ignore, act on, learn, and remember.

A Computational Proposal
An operational definition of Intentionality requires a computational model that can represent the
richness of referencing, processing, and management that has been indicated. As an illocutionary
act, intending commands, asserts, questions, expresses, activates, prioritizes, and commits. If such
operations are understood as computational in nature then a programming architecture suited to the
task is needed. Charles Simonyi (1996), principle software architect at Microsoft, has articulated the
concept of “intentional programming” in which intentions are expressed as a powerful ecology of
abstractions which can be extended to support many outcomes. In such a view the abstractions and
their relationships specify an ontology of potential experiences distinct from their application.
Entailments extending from the abstractions act to structure thought as do constraints in the
situation being addressed. The user’s intentions become expressed through the content, structure
and interactions afforded through the component abstractions of the computational system.
It has been suggested that Intending (the initiation, processing and management of goal directed
thought and action) and Integrating (accessing, adapting and applying knowledge derived from
situated experiences) are modal components of higher level thinking. These two components
manage and resolve purposeful thinking in terms of five subordinate modes that address different
aspects of a situated experience. All seven modes of thinking are treated as components in a
collaborative enterprise framework that implements a distributed computing system (Kobryn 2000).
Each component is thought of as an enabling abstraction – an “intentional object model” –
representing an aspect of experience that can be instantiated in a great many ways. The
instantiation and processing of these components is managed through the “Intending” Component,
the collaborative outcome (the “design”) is presented through the “Mediating” component, and
knowledge of the experience is maintained in the “Integrating” component (adaptive memory).
Although a computational specification of these components is beyond the scope of this paper,
Figure 3 provides a diagram using the conventions of the Universal Modeling Language for
software development (UML) to characterize a distributed component enterprise framework and the
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computational interactions between all seven modal components. It will be seen that each mode of
thinking, including Intending and Integrating, is to be implemented as a distinct computational
agency in a collaborative framework. A more extensive treatment of this internet oriented
distributed processing model is presented elsewhere (Burnette 2001c).

Fig. 3: Component Enterprise Framework for distributed design computing

In summary, the “Intending” component in a computational model of design thinking should
provide a three level, hierarchically structured interactive process to 1) initiate an intentional frame
2) index situated information to the frame 3) index relevant and well configured knowledge in
episodic memory to the situated information 4) compare the situated and recalled information 5)
resolve mismatches to approximate goal criteria 6) accept, replace, reprioritize, defer or dismiss the
outcome 7) and transfer frame control to an Integrating adaptive memory as appropriate. While the
issues involved have been explored in the field of artificial intelligence, they have not been
formulated or implemented as indicated in Figure 3.

Discussion
This paper has focused on Intentionality and its interactive relationship with background
knowledge. Some philosophical points and theoretical suggestions regarding the structural
representation and operational modeling of these agencies have been made and relevant literature
has been cited. It is hoped that the presentation has made the point that Intentionality serves as the
headwater for the flow of design thinking and that no theory or model of design thinking can afford
to ignore it. The implication for design research and practice is that more attention should be paid to
the dynamic matching of prior knowledge to the focus of current concern. While this does happen
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to some degree, for example, when an architect asks a client for magazine clippings to learn what
they like, or when an ethnographic researcher attempts to understand user behavior in the context of
need, or when a designer uses hypothetical scenarios to better anticipate user behavior, such
techniques are not fully integrated into design thinking, or computational support systems. Until
they are we will be unable to study and improve the process as a whole.
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